(C)  An Offense that “Relates To” a Given Subject-Matter.  It is possible to argue that when the aggravated felony statute lists “an offense that – (i) relates to the owning, controlling, managing, or supervising of a prostitution business,”[143]  this definition is limited to offenses that are specifically listed within its terms, and does not more broadly include any additional offense that “relates to” the listed offenses.  If this is accepted, a conviction of an offense that “relates to” managing a prostitution business, but is not an offense that consists in owning, controlling, managing, or supervising a prostitution business,”[144] would not be included in this aggravated felony category.

 

            This issue has been confronted in the context of considering whether a conviction of misprision of a felony would fall within the aggravated felony category of “an offense relating to obstruction of justice . . . .”[145]  See § 7.85, infra (conviction of misprision is not conviction of an offense “relating to” obstruction of justice).

            This issue has also arisen more frequently in the context of the controlled substances conviction ground of deportation, in which the courts have placed considerable limits on the sweep of the “relating to” phrase.  See § 7.142, infra.

[143] INA § 101(a)(43)(K)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(K)(i) (emphasis supplied).

[144] INA § 101(a)(43)(K)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(K)(i) (emphasis supplied).

[145] INA § 101(a)(43)(S), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - DRUG TRAFFICKING - USE OF A COMMUNICATION FACILITY
United States v. Jimenez, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 2813046 (9th Cir. Jul. 23, 2008) (federal conviction for unlawful use of a communication facility, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 843(b), qualifies as "drug trafficking offenses" under USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i)), following United States v. Orihuela, 320 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2003).

Fifth Circuit

CONVICTION - EFFECT OF STATE LAW ON FEDERAL IMMIGRATION DECISION - IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTIONS ARE QUESTIONS OF FEDERAL, NOT STATE, LAW
United States v. Fazande, 487 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. May 18, 2007) (per curiam) (federal sentence effect of state conviction is a question of federal, not state law, holding Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738, did not require federal sentencing court to follow state law on whether it constituted a conviction to enhance a federal sentence); see United States v. Morales, 854 F.2d 65, 68 (5th Cir. 1988) (the meaning of the phrase "have become final" in 18 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B) is a question of federal law, not state law).

DIVISIBLE STATUTE ANALYSIS - STATE LABEL
United States v. Iniguez-Barba, ___ F.3d ___, 485 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. April 25, 2007) (per curiam) ("While we don't look only to the label of the statute at issue to determine what exactly it proscribes, see Fierro-Reyna, 466 F.3d at 326-27, of course we must look to the labels of the statutes to which we compare the statute at issue.")

Sixth Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " FELONY FLIGHT FROM OFFICER
Ruiz-Lopez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 513, *520 (6th Cir. Jun. 19, 2012) (Washington conviction of felony flight from an officer, in violation of Washington Revised Code 46.61.024, categorically rose to the level of a crime of moral turpitude, since willful or wanton disregard for the lives or property of others is an essential element of the offense: The element of wanton or willful disregard clearly fulfills the requisite scienter component, and cases such as Mei and Pulido-Alatorre show that intentionally fleeing from a police vehicle qualifies as the type of socially condemned, reprehensible conduct that is reasonably encompassed by the BIA's general definition of a CIMT.).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " RECKLESSNESS
Ruiz-Lopez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 513, *518 (6th Cir. Jun. 19, 2012) (Washington conviction of felony flight from an officer, in violation of Washington Revised Code 46.61.024, may or may not categorically rise to the level of a crime of moral turpitude: We express no opinion regarding whether flight accompanied by only a reckless mens rea also categorically meets the BIA's definition of a CIMT [applicable to convictions after the most recent amendment in 2003 lowered the mens rea to recklessness for the third element of this offense].).

Seventh Circuit

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - DESCRIBED IN
Negrete-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2008) ("Negrete is arguing that defined in and described in are synonymous. We reject this argument, primarily because it renders the distinction between the terms described in and defined in meaningless. See United States v. Michalek, 54 F.3d 325, 335-36 (7th Cir. 1995). Also, it does not follow that, because Congress has defined some crimes in general terms, it had to define all crimes in general terms in order for the offense's state law counterpart to be included within the definition of an aggravated felony. Indeed, many firearms offenses are not susceptible to being easily described in general terms, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4) (offense of possession of a firearm or ammunition by someone who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution); while others are dependent on other provisions in a statutory scheme. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 922(o) (making it unlawful for a person to possess a "machinegun," where that term is defined elsewhere in the National Firearms Act). Congress could therefore rationally have decided to describe those offenses by reference to the statutory provision where they were located rather than conjuring up an awkward general descriptor, or having to recopy several parts of a statutory scheme.").

Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - DRUG TRAFFICKING - USE OF A COMMUNICATION FACILITY
United States v. Jimenez, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 2813046 (9th Cir. Jul. 23, 2008) (federal conviction for unlawful use of a communication facility, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 843(b), qualifies as "drug trafficking offenses" under USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i)), following United States v. Orihuela, 320 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2003).

NATURE OF CONVICTION - "RELATING TO"
United States v. Sinerius, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 2728760 (9th Cir. Sept. 20, 2007) ("The phrase relating to, as defined by the Supreme Court, means to stand in some relation to; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 383, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1128 (5th ed.1979)) (construing relating to in a different statutory context). We have construed relating to language broadly in the past, see Luu-Le v. INS, 224 F.3d 911, 915-16 (interpreting the phrase relating to a controlled substance in section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), and the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have done the same when interpreting this provision and the materially indistinguishable text of 2252, see Hubbard, 480 F.3d at 347 (We must assume that Congress chose the words relating to [in 2252A(b)(1) ] for a purpose.); United States v. Weis, 487 F.3d 1148, 1152 (8th Cir.2007) (construing relating to broadly in 2252); United States v. McCutchen, 419 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir.2005) (same).").

Other

MARIANA ISLANDS COME UNDER INA
S.2739 became Public Law No. 110-229 on May 8, 2008, the immigration related provisions are excerpted here. http://www.ilw.com/immigdaily/news/2008,0514-cnmi.shtm