(B)  Juvenile Court Orders.  This deportation ground may apply to juveniles, as well as adults, since it does not depend on the existence of a criminal conviction, and it is likely (though not certain) that a juvenile court would be considered a “civil or criminal court” for this purpose.  It is therefore important to avoid a juvenile-court finding that the minor violated a domestic violence TRO.  If such a finding is suffered, appealing the finding will arguably delay its finality and prevent the immigration authorities from using it to begin deportation proceedings until the appeal is over.[1197]           Immigration counsel can argue that authority holding juvenile court findings do not constitute convictions[1198] would preclude deportability based on this type of finding as well.[1199]

[1197] K. Brady, California Criminal Law And Immigration § § 2.1, 8.25 (2004).

[1198] Matter of Ramirez-Rivero, 18 I. & N. Dec. 135 (BIA 1981); Matter of CM, 5 I. & N. Dec. 327 (BIA 1953) (juvenile finding of commission of crime involving moral turpitude does not constitute a “conviction” or trigger inadmissibility).

[1199] Counsel can argue that a juvenile-court finding that a juvenile violated a domestic-violence protection order cannot constitute a ground of deportation for the same reasons a criminal conviction cannot constitute a conviction-based ground of deportation.  See Chapter 4, infra.

BIA

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER NOT A "CRIME"
Counsel can argue that a violation of a protective order cannot be considered a CMT unless the criminal prosecutor filed a criminal charge under a criminal statute such as California Penal Code 273.6. A civil court finding that triggers removal under INA 237(a)(2)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C, 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) should not be considered a "crime" of moral turpitude. Cf. Matter of Eslamizar, 23 I. & N. Dec. 684, 687 (BIA Oct. 19, 2004) (Oregon "violation" judgment in which there was no right to appointed counsel, no right to jury trial, no jail possible, and no right against conviction absent proof beyond a reasonable doubt, did not constitute a "conviction" for immigration purposes).

Even if a "conviction" results, counsel can still argue that violation of a protective order is a regulatory offense, rather than a crime of moral turpitude, because there is nothing inherently wrong with violating a court order; it is just that the judge has forbidden it. Matter of Sanudo, 23 I. & N. Dec. 968 (BIA Aug. 1, 2006) (de minimus battery against a spouse is not a CMT), can also be used to argue that conviction for a technical or de minimis violation of a protective order cannot categorically be considered a CMT.

Eighth Circuit

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE - CONFIDENTIALITY
United States v. Maswai, 419 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2005) (8 U.S.C. 1367(a) restricts the use of immigration information furnished by a battering spouse in making a determination of admissibility or excludability but does not apply to exclude immigration evidence in a criminal proceeding).

Ninth Circuit

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE - PROTECTIVE ORDER VIOLATION - WHETHER RESPONDENT'S ADMISSION THAT HE WAS DEPORTABLE ON THIS GROUND IN PLEADING TO THE NTA CAN PROVIDE A BASIS (ANALOGOUS TO THE RECORD OF CONVICTION) FOR DEPORTATION
Teaupa v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 580672 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2007) ("We requested additional briefing on the issue [whether respondent's admission, in pleading to the NTA, that a court had determined he had engaged in conduct that violated a portion of a DV protection order that involved protection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person(s) for whom the protection order had been issued], and we now remand to the BIA to consider, in the first instance, whether Teaupas admission can be used to determine removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).").

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE - VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER - WHETHER PROTECTIVE ORDER MUST BE LEGALLY VALID BEFORE A FINDING OF ITS VIOLATION CAN TRIGGER DEPORTATION
United States v. Young, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2006) (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8)(A) makes it a federal offense to possess a firearm by one against whom a domestic violence restraining order has been issued "after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate" and there is no right to collaterally attack the constitutionality of the state court restraining order since those proceedings are immaterial except to the extent that the federal statute explicitly requires certain procedural protections).