Counsel must fully and correctly inform a client of the nature of the charges against him or her, including the elements of those charges and possible defenses to the charges.[109]  The argument is particularly strong if the reporter’s transcript affirmatively shows the defendant was misinformed about an essential element of the offense.   In addition, erroneous advice surrounding the guilty plea can deprive the defendant of the right to make a well-informed decision about whether to accept a favorable plea offer, and can therefore amount to prejudicial ineffective assistance.[110] 

 

            Ineffective counsel can be shown if counsel failed to inform the defendant of a potentially meritorious defense; that would render the plea involuntary.[111]  Resolution of the “prejudice” inquiry will depend largely on whether the defendant can make a showing that the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.[112]  For example, counsel’s failure to file a meritorious motion to dismiss the charges on double jeopardy grounds has been held to be constitutionally inadequate performance.[113]   

            Counsel’s errors in submitting jury instructions can also amount to ineffective assistance, especially where the failure deprives the defendant of his theory of the defense.[114]  Allowing the defendant to admit the elements of the offense, but then failing to request an entrapment instruction, deprives the defendant of the right to present a defense when supported by the evidence so as to amount to ineffective assistance.[115]

 

            Counsel also may render ineffective assistance by failing to recommend whether to accept a plea offer.  While there is no per se rule that effective counsel must recommend whether or not to accept a plea offer,[116] counsel should make an independent examination of the case and offer an informed opinion as to what plea should be entered.[117]  

[109] See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976); McCarthy v. United States, supra, at 466.

[110] United States v. Day, 285 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2002) (relief granted where counsel wrongly informed client that he could only argue sentencing entrapment to mitigate punishment if he contested his guilt at trial).

[111] Evans v. Meyer, 742 F.2d 371 (7th Cir. 1984); Sober v. Crist, 644 F.2d 807, 809 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981); see Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (prejudice is shown where the defense would likely have succeeded at trial).

[112] Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Evans v. Meyer, 742 F.2d 371, 375 (7th Cir. 1984).

[113] Wilcox v. McGee, 241 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2001).

[114] United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383 (9th Cir. 1996).

[115] Capps v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1990).

[116] Purdy v. United States, 208 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2000).

[117] Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948); see also Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 1996)(conviction vacated for failure to express opinion defendant should accept offer, citing 1992 Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility, EC 7-7, requiring counsel to “advise [the] client fully on whether a particular plea to a charge appears to be desirable”).

Ninth Circuit

POST CON RELIEF " REASON TO BELIEVE
Chavez-Reyes v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1 (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 2014) (denying petition for review from BIA decision finding petitioner inadmissible because there was reason to believe that he engaged in or assisted others in illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, under INA 212(a)(2)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(C)(i), based on circumstantial evidence and on his guilty plea to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, where the BIA did not violate petitioner's due process rights by considering his guilty plea, even though the court overturned the criminal conviction on appeal, because the court overturned the conviction solely because the police officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop, a reason unrelated to the voluntariness of the guilty plea). Note: Counsel can do a better job of establishing the connection between the Fourth Amendment violation and the voluntariness of the plea. The plea was involuntary because defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to suppress the evidence, and in failing to inform the defendant of the inadmissibility of the evidence, so the plea was based on misinformation concerning the admissibility of the evidence against the defendant.

Other

CAL POST CON " GROUNDS " ADVICE OF COUNSEL " IMPROPER INDUCEMENT BY COUNSEL TO ENTER PLEA
People v. Nocelotl, 211 Cal.App.4th 496, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 706 (6th Dist. Nov. 28, 2012) ([T]he advice, persuasion, or expression of [a defendant's] attorney will not suffice to vitiate his plea, in the absence of some showing of corroboration by a responsible state officer [citations]. (People v. Toth (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 130, 132, 36 Cal.Rptr. 417; see also In re Nunez (1965) 62 Cal.2d 234, 236, 42 Cal.Rptr. 6, 397 P.2d 998 [In the absence of an allegation of state involvement. Petitioner's allegations that counsel improperly induced him to enter a guilty plea does not state a ground for coram nobis relief]; In re Atchely (1957) 48 Cal.2d 408, 418, 310 P.2d 15 [Mere advice or assurance by a private [or appointed] attorney to a defendant accused of crime will not vitiate a plea entered in reliance thereon].)).