Good Moral Character is required in the following situations:

ARTICLE " CAL POST CON " EFFECT OF CHAIDEZ V. UNITED STATES ON CALIFORNIA LAW CONCERNING PADILLA CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WITH RESPECT TO IMMIGRATION ADVICE
In Chaidez v. United States, ___ U.S.___, ___ S.Ct.___, 2013 WL 610201 (Feb. 20, 2013), the Supreme Court held that Padilla does not apply to convictions that were already final on March 31, 2010 under the retroactivity analysis in Teague. Padilla did not much change on the California law on this subject. In California, in 1987, the First District Court of Appeals held it is ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to investigate the federal immigration consequences of a disposition and to fail to advise a foreign national defendant of them before plea. People v. Soriano, 194 Cal.App.3d 1470 (1987). In 1989, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held it to be ineffective assistance to fail to request a non-deportable sentence. People v. Barocio, 216 Cal.App.3d 99 (1989). Both of these decisions have been binding on trial courts statewide since their decision. Therefore, criminal defense counsel and lower state courts were bound to follow those opinions. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456) (Under the doctrine of stare decisis, all tribunals exercising inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction.) The California Supreme Court then held it to be ineffective assistance of counsel to give affirmative misadvice to a noncitizen concerning the immigration consequences of a plea if prejudice is shown. In re Resendiz, 25 Cal.4th 230, 105 Cal.Rptr. 2d 431 (2001). The Sixth District Court of Appeals held it to be ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to seek a non-deportable plea to a greater offense. People v. Bautista, 115 Cal.App.4th 229 (2004). The holding of Padilla, therefore, does not significantly change California law concerning effective assistance to noncitizen defendants in advising them of, and helping them avoid, disastrous immigration consequences of criminal convictions. Padillas major effect on California law is that the California Supreme Court must now recognize that a failure to advise a defendant can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, an issue on which it was as yet unpersuaded in 2001 when it decided Resendiz. This unpersuaded statement, however, was nothing more than dictum, since the failure to advise claim was not before the California Supreme Court in Resendiz. The Court in Resendiz did not overrule or even cite the Soriano decision, that held since 1987 that failure to advise was ineffective. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (Mar. 31, 2010), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires an attorney for a criminal defendant affirmatively to provide accurate advice about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea. In Chaidez v. United States, ___ U.S.___, ___ S.Ct.___, 2013 WL 610201 (Feb. 20, 2013), the Supreme Court held that under the principles set out in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), Padilla does not have retroactive effect. Therefore, defendants whose convictions became final prior to Padilla [March 31, 2010] therefore cannot benefit from its holding. (Chaidez, supra, at *10.) Defendants with convictions that were still on appeal, or as to which the time for filing a notice of appeal had not yet expired, may still take advantage of the new rule of Padilla. Seven justices joined in the judgment, with Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsberg, dissenting. There are several important limitations to the Chaidez decision. Padilla decided two distinct claims: First, it held that counsels affirmative misadvice concerning the actual immigration consequences of a plea constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Second, it held that counsels failure affirmatively to advise the client of those consequences also constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. In Chaidez, only a failure to advise claim was raised, and the Supreme Courts holding in Chaidez therefore only addressed failure to advise claims. The Supreme Court explicitly distinguished affirmative misadvice claims as not subject to its retroactivity holding: True enough, three federal circuits (and a handful of state courts) held before Padilla that misstatements about deportation could support an ineffective assistance claim. But those decisions reasoned only that a lawyer may not affirmatively misrepresent his expertise or otherwise actively mislead his client on any important matter, however related to a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015"1017 (C.A.9 2005). They co-existed happily with precedent, from the same jurisdictions (and almost all others), holding that deportation is not so unique as to warrant an exception to the general rule that a defendant need not be advised of the [collateral] consequences of a guilty plea. United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 769 (C.A.11 1985).FN14 So at most, Chaidez has shown that a minority of courts recognized a separate rule for material misrepresentations, regardless whether they concerned deportation or another collateral matter. That limited rule does not apply to Chaidez's case. And because it lived in harmony with the exclusion of claims like hers from the Sixth Amendment, it does not establish what she needs to"that all reasonable judges, prior to Padilla, thought they were living in a Padilla-like world. (Id. at ___ [emphasis supplied].) Therefore, the Chaidez holding on retroactivity of Padilla does not apply to the separate rule for material misrepresentations as to federal immigration consequences of a plea, that pre-existed Padilla and lived in harmony with the exclusion of claims like hers [failure to advise claims] from the Sixth Amendment . . . . (Ibid.) The affirmative misrepresentation rule, that material misrepresentations constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, falls within the normal run of Strickland claims, and there is no reason to believe it was a new rule. This rule by 2001 was considered a clear state and federal consensus on federal constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel. One of those state courts, though not mentioned in Chaidez, that earlier recognized failure to advise clients was the California Supreme Court. In 2001, ten years before Padilla was decided, that court held that the collateral consequences doctrine did not categorically bar a claim that affirmative misadvice concerning the adverse immigration consequences of a plea constituted reversible ineffective assistance of counsel if prejudice was shown. In re Resendiz, 25 Cal.4th 230, 248, 105 Cal.Rptr. 2d 431 (2001) (For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that neither the existence of section 1016.5 nor the collateral nature of immigration consequences constitutes a per se bar to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel's misadvice about the adverse immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Therefore, we may not in this case avoid the circumstance-specific reasonableness inquiry required by Strickland. ( Roe v. Flores"Ortega, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 478 [120 S.Ct. at p. 1035]; see also Hill, supra, 474 U.S. at pp. 57"58, 106 S.Ct. 366; U.S. v. Mora"Gomez, supra, 875 F.Supp. at p. 1213.) Accordingly, we shall proceed to apply Strickland 's familiar reasonableness standard to the circumstances of the instant case. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052.)). In reaching that conclusion, the court reviewed the nationwide state of the law " state and federal -- concerning affirmative misadvice claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: Even among the federal and other courts cited by the Attorney General, the clear consensus is that an affirmative misstatement regarding deportation may constitute ineffective assistance. (U.S. v. Mora-Gomez, supra, 875 F.Supp. at p. 1212.) FN14 FN14. See also People v. Huynh (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1067, 1083, 281 Cal.Rptr. 785; Ostrander v. Green (4th Cir.1995) 46 F.3d 347, 355, overruled on another point in O'Dell v. Netherland (4th Cir.1996) 95 F.3d 1214; U.S. v. Del Rosario, supra, 902 F.2d at page 59 and footnote 2; U.S. v. George (7th Cir.1989) 869 F.2d 333, 337; United States v. Campbell (11th Cir.1985) 778 F.2d 764, 768"769; Downs"Morgan v. United States (11th Cir.1985) 765 F.2d 1534, 1541; United States v. Santelises (2d Cir.1975) 509 F.2d 703, 703"704; United States v. Briscoe (D.C.Cir.1970) 432 F.2d 1351, 1353"1354; U.S. v. Corona-Maldonado (D.Kan.1999) 46 F.Supp.2d 1171, 1173; United States v. Nagaro-Garbin (E.D.Mich.1987) 653 F.Supp. 586, 590; People v. Pozo, supra, 746 P.2d at page 527, footnote 5; People v. Ford (1995) 86 N.Y.2d 397, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270, 657 N.E.2d 265, 268"269; People v. Correa (1985) 108 Ill.2d 541, 92 Ill.Dec. 496, 485 N.E.2d 307, 310"311. There are a very few cases suggesting an affirmative misrepresentation is constitutionally irremediable (see, e.g., United States v. Sambro (D.C.Cir.1971) 454 F.2d 918, 921 922; United States v. Parrino (2d Cir.1954) 212 F.2d 919, 921"922), but, as one court has remarked, we properly may regard those cases as aberrations (Strader v. Garrison (4th Cir.1979) 611 F.2d 61, 64). (Id. at 251, 105 Cal.Rptr. 2d 446.) See also, e.g., United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 187-88 (2d Cir. 2002); Commonwealth v. Tahmas, Nos. 105254, 105255, 2005 WL 2249587, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 26, 2005); Rollins v. State, 591 S.E.2d 796 (Ga. 2004). Further research will disclose additional favorable affirmative misadvice decisions handed down after Resendiz in 2001, but prior to Padilla in 2010. This national clear consensus was that affirmative misadvice concerning the adverse immigration consequences of a plea constitutes deficient performance of counsel. The simplest conclusion, therefore, is that at least 10 years before Padilla was decided, prejudicial affirmative misadvice was a claim that could be used to invalidate a state or federal conviction as a matter of federal constitutional law. At a minimum, the law in the specific jurisdictions cited above, and any others in which the law was the same, could be used to invalidate convictions that became final after the date of decision in each jurisdiction holding that affirmative misadvice constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Failure to advise claims, in addition, remain alive prior to Padilla in those jurisdictions with decisions to that effect. These jurisdictions include at least California, Colorado, and New Mexico, which had already held that failure to advise claims constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 527"529 (Colo.1987); State v. Paredez, 2004"NMSC"036, 17"19, 136 N.M. 533, 539, 101 P.3d 799, 805; People v. Soriano, 194 Cal.App.3d 1470 (1987). The fact that Padilla does not apply retroactively does not invalidate prior state decisions holding to the contrary. The Supreme Court in Chaidez was wrong to omit California from the (short) list of jurisdictions that adopted the failure to advise rule prior to Padilla. California since 1987 has held that failure to advise constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Soriano (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1470, 240 Cal.Rptr. 328. This California 1987 decision was based on both the state and federal constitutions. People v. Soriano, 194 Cal.App.3d 1470, 1478-1479 (1987) (Both our federal and state Constitutions give a criminal defendant the right to assistance of counsel. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, 15.) The right to counsel entitles a defendant to effective counsel. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052]; People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d 412, 423-424.) The standard against which counsel's effectiveness will be measured is that of reasonably *1479 competent' attorney who acts as a diligent conscientious advocate. ( United States v. DeCoster (D.C.Cir 1973) 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 [487 F.2d 1197]; accord People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 423.)). The federal Constitution provides minimum guarantees of fundamental constitutional rights, but certainly does not prohibit the State of California from granting greater protections in its constitution. States must enforce minimum federal constitutional standards, but are free to adopt additional protections. (Reynolds v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 834, 842, 117 Cal.Rptr. 437; Cal. Const., Art. I, 24 (declaring that [r]ights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution.)) Moreover, state courts are charged with enforcing federal constitutional guarantees, and nothing in Padilla or Chaidez holds that Soriano was in error. It merely reached the correct conclusion earlier than the federal courts. As Rebecca Sharpless pointed out, the court in declined to address Chaidezs two additional arguments: 1) Teagues analysis does not apply because she, unlike Teague, had a federal rather than a state conviction; and 2) new rules apply in post-conviction proceedings raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims because such claims cannot be brought on direct appeal. The Court thus applied Teague for the first in a federal case, but it did so without ruling that Teague should apply, leaving the question open for future litigation. Moreover, both state and federal litigants can still take up Chaidezs argument that new rules apply in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that must be brought on post-conviction rather than direct appeal. Rebecca Sharpless, Chaidez V. U.S.: Assuming Teague Applies, Padilla Announced A New Rule (2/22/13), http://crimmigration.com/2013/02/22/chaidez-v-us--assuming-teague-applies-padilla-announced--a-new-rule.aspx. Since these two arguments were not properly preserved and presented in Chaidez, the Supreme Court did not decide them. Therefore, counsel are free to argue: (1) Teague does not apply in state proceedings, unless the state has independently chosen to follow the Teague rule. (2) New rules apply in post-conviction proceedings raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims because such claims cannot be brought on direct appeal. Chaidez does not apply to review of state claims under state authority. It held merely that Padilla does not apply to cases already final on March 31, 2010, when it was decided. Favorable state authority decided prior to Padilla holding defense counsels failure to advise, or affirmative misadvice, concerning adverse immigration consequences of a plea such as that in California, remains intact. This is particularly important in California, where state authority condemned failure to advise as ineffective assistance of counsel has existed since 1987. Following the rule set forth in People v. Soriano, a California Court of Appeals panel in 1989 made explicit what was only implicit in Soriano: the duty to advise about immigration consequences also includes the duty to defend against those consequences. People v. Barocio, (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 99 (failure to file judicial recommendation against deportation or seek 364 day sentence is ineffective assistance of counsel). This was also the holding in People v. Bautista (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 229 (counsel correctly told the defendant that he would be deported for possession of sale conviction, but failure to attempt to plead up to offer to sell or transportation may be ineffective assistance of counsel). This prior authority does not depend on Padilla, and so remains useful even though Padilla itself does not apply to cases already final when it was decided.

Other

ARTICLE " CAL POST CON " EFFECT OF CHAIDEZ V. UNITED STATES ON CALIFORNIA LAW CONCERNING PADILLA CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WITH RESPECT TO IMMIGRATION ADVICE
In Chaidez v. United States, ___ U.S.___, ___ S.Ct.___, 2013 WL 610201 (Feb. 20, 2013), the Supreme Court held that Padilla does not apply to convictions that were already final on March 31, 2010 under the retroactivity analysis in Teague. Padilla did not much change on the California law on this subject. In California, in 1987, the First District Court of Appeals held it is ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to investigate the federal immigration consequences of a disposition and to fail to advise a foreign national defendant of them before plea. People v. Soriano, 194 Cal.App.3d 1470 (1987). In 1989, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held it to be ineffective assistance to fail to request a non-deportable sentence. People v. Barocio, 216 Cal.App.3d 99 (1989). Both of these decisions have been binding on trial courts statewide since their decision. Therefore, criminal defense counsel and lower state courts were bound to follow those opinions. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456) (Under the doctrine of stare decisis, all tribunals exercising inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction.) The California Supreme Court then held it to be ineffective assistance of counsel to give affirmative misadvice to a noncitizen concerning the immigration consequences of a plea if prejudice is shown. In re Resendiz, 25 Cal.4th 230, 105 Cal.Rptr. 2d 431 (2001). The Sixth District Court of Appeals held it to be ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to seek a non-deportable plea to a greater offense. People v. Bautista, 115 Cal.App.4th 229 (2004). The holding of Padilla, therefore, does not significantly change California law concerning effective assistance to noncitizen defendants in advising them of, and helping them avoid, disastrous immigration consequences of criminal convictions. Padillas major effect on California law is that the California Supreme Court must now recognize that a failure to advise a defendant can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, an issue on which it was as yet unpersuaded in 2001 when it decided Resendiz. This unpersuaded statement, however, was nothing more than dictum, since the failure to advise claim was not before the California Supreme Court in Resendiz. The Court in Resendiz did not overrule or even cite the Soriano decision, that held since 1987 that failure to advise was ineffective. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (Mar. 31, 2010), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires an attorney for a criminal defendant affirmatively to provide accurate advice about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea. In Chaidez v. United States, ___ U.S.___, ___ S.Ct.___, 2013 WL 610201 (Feb. 20, 2013), the Supreme Court held that under the principles set out in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), Padilla does not have retroactive effect. Therefore, defendants whose convictions became final prior to Padilla [March 31, 2010] therefore cannot benefit from its holding. (Chaidez, supra, at *10.) Defendants with convictions that were still on appeal, or as to which the time for filing a notice of appeal had not yet expired, may still take advantage of the new rule of Padilla. Seven justices joined in the judgment, with Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsberg, dissenting. There are several important limitations to the Chaidez decision. Padilla decided two distinct claims: First, it held that counsels affirmative misadvice concerning the actual immigration consequences of a plea constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Second, it held that counsels failure affirmatively to advise the client of those consequences also constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. In Chaidez, only a failure to advise claim was raised, and the Supreme Courts holding in Chaidez therefore only addressed failure to advise claims. The Supreme Court explicitly distinguished affirmative misadvice claims as not subject to its retroactivity holding: True enough, three federal circuits (and a handful of state courts) held before Padilla that misstatements about deportation could support an ineffective assistance claim. But those decisions reasoned only that a lawyer may not affirmatively misrepresent his expertise or otherwise actively mislead his client on any important matter, however related to a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015"1017 (C.A.9 2005). They co-existed happily with precedent, from the same jurisdictions (and almost all others), holding that deportation is not so unique as to warrant an exception to the general rule that a defendant need not be advised of the [collateral] consequences of a guilty plea. United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 769 (C.A.11 1985).FN14 So at most, Chaidez has shown that a minority of courts recognized a separate rule for material misrepresentations, regardless whether they concerned deportation or another collateral matter. That limited rule does not apply to Chaidez's case. And because it lived in harmony with the exclusion of claims like hers from the Sixth Amendment, it does not establish what she needs to"that all reasonable judges, prior to Padilla, thought they were living in a Padilla-like world. (Id. at ___ [emphasis supplied].) Therefore, the Chaidez holding on retroactivity of Padilla does not apply to the separate rule for material misrepresentations as to federal immigration consequences of a plea, that pre-existed Padilla and lived in harmony with the exclusion of claims like hers [failure to advise claims] from the Sixth Amendment . . . . (Ibid.) The affirmative misrepresentation rule, that material misrepresentations constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, falls within the normal run of Strickland claims, and there is no reason to believe it was a new rule. This rule by 2001 was considered a clear state and federal consensus on federal constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel. One of those state courts, though not mentioned in Chaidez, that earlier recognized failure to advise clients was the California Supreme Court. In 2001, ten years before Padilla was decided, that court held that the collateral consequences doctrine did not categorically bar a claim that affirmative misadvice concerning the adverse immigration consequences of a plea constituted reversible ineffective assistance of counsel if prejudice was shown. In re Resendiz, 25 Cal.4th 230, 248, 105 Cal.Rptr. 2d 431 (2001) (For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that neither the existence of section 1016.5 nor the collateral nature of immigration consequences constitutes a per se bar to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel's misadvice about the adverse immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Therefore, we may not in this case avoid the circumstance-specific reasonableness inquiry required by Strickland. ( Roe v. Flores"Ortega, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 478 [120 S.Ct. at p. 1035]; see also Hill, supra, 474 U.S. at pp. 57"58, 106 S.Ct. 366; U.S. v. Mora"Gomez, supra, 875 F.Supp. at p. 1213.) Accordingly, we shall proceed to apply Strickland 's familiar reasonableness standard to the circumstances of the instant case. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052.)). In reaching that conclusion, the court reviewed the nationwide state of the law " state and federal -- concerning affirmative misadvice claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: Even among the federal and other courts cited by the Attorney General, the clear consensus is that an affirmative misstatement regarding deportation may constitute ineffective assistance. (U.S. v. Mora-Gomez, supra, 875 F.Supp. at p. 1212.) FN14 FN14. See also People v. Huynh (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1067, 1083, 281 Cal.Rptr. 785; Ostrander v. Green (4th Cir.1995) 46 F.3d 347, 355, overruled on another point in O'Dell v. Netherland (4th Cir.1996) 95 F.3d 1214; U.S. v. Del Rosario, supra, 902 F.2d at page 59 and footnote 2; U.S. v. George (7th Cir.1989) 869 F.2d 333, 337; United States v. Campbell (11th Cir.1985) 778 F.2d 764, 768"769; Downs"Morgan v. United States (11th Cir.1985) 765 F.2d 1534, 1541; United States v. Santelises (2d Cir.1975) 509 F.2d 703, 703"704; United States v. Briscoe (D.C.Cir.1970) 432 F.2d 1351, 1353"1354; U.S. v. Corona-Maldonado (D.Kan.1999) 46 F.Supp.2d 1171, 1173; United States v. Nagaro-Garbin (E.D.Mich.1987) 653 F.Supp. 586, 590; People v. Pozo, supra, 746 P.2d at page 527, footnote 5; People v. Ford (1995) 86 N.Y.2d 397, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270, 657 N.E.2d 265, 268"269; People v. Correa (1985) 108 Ill.2d 541, 92 Ill.Dec. 496, 485 N.E.2d 307, 310"311. There are a very few cases suggesting an affirmative misrepresentation is constitutionally irremediable (see, e.g., United States v. Sambro (D.C.Cir.1971) 454 F.2d 918, 921 922; United States v. Parrino (2d Cir.1954) 212 F.2d 919, 921"922), but, as one court has remarked, we properly may regard those cases as aberrations (Strader v. Garrison (4th Cir.1979) 611 F.2d 61, 64). (Id. at 251, 105 Cal.Rptr. 2d 446.) See also, e.g., United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 187-88 (2d Cir. 2002); Commonwealth v. Tahmas, Nos. 105254, 105255, 2005 WL 2249587, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 26, 2005); Rollins v. State, 591 S.E.2d 796 (Ga. 2004). Further research will disclose additional favorable affirmative misadvice decisions handed down after Resendiz in 2001, but prior to Padilla in 2010. This national clear consensus was that affirmative misadvice concerning the adverse immigration consequences of a plea constitutes deficient performance of counsel. The simplest conclusion, therefore, is that at least 10 years before Padilla was decided, prejudicial affirmative misadvice was a claim that could be used to invalidate a state or federal conviction as a matter of federal constitutional law. At a minimum, the law in the specific jurisdictions cited above, and any others in which the law was the same, could be used to invalidate convictions that became final after the date of decision in each jurisdiction holding that affirmative misadvice constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Failure to advise claims, in addition, remain alive prior to Padilla in those jurisdictions with decisions to that effect. These jurisdictions include at least California, Colorado, and New Mexico, which had already held that failure to advise claims constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 527"529 (Colo.1987); State v. Paredez, 2004"NMSC"036, 17"19, 136 N.M. 533, 539, 101 P.3d 799, 805; People v. Soriano, 194 Cal.App.3d 1470 (1987). The fact that Padilla does not apply retroactively does not invalidate prior state decisions holding to the contrary. The Supreme Court in Chaidez was wrong to omit California from the (short) list of jurisdictions that adopted the failure to advise rule prior to Padilla. California since 1987 has held that failure to advise constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Soriano (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1470, 240 Cal.Rptr. 328. This California 1987 decision was based on both the state and federal constitutions. People v. Soriano, 194 Cal.App.3d 1470, 1478-1479 (1987) (Both our federal and state Constitutions give a criminal defendant the right to assistance of counsel. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, 15.) The right to counsel entitles a defendant to effective counsel. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052]; People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d 412, 423-424.) The standard against which counsel's effectiveness will be measured is that of reasonably *1479 competent' attorney who acts as a diligent conscientious advocate. ( United States v. DeCoster (D.C.Cir 1973) 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 [487 F.2d 1197]; accord People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 423.)). The federal Constitution provides minimum guarantees of fundamental constitutional rights, but certainly does not prohibit the State of California from granting greater protections in its constitution. States must enforce minimum federal constitutional standards, but are free to adopt additional protections. (Reynolds v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 834, 842, 117 Cal.Rptr. 437; Cal. Const., Art. I, 24 (declaring that [r]ights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution.)) Moreover, state courts are charged with enforcing federal constitutional guarantees, and nothing in Padilla or Chaidez holds that Soriano was in error. It merely reached the correct conclusion earlier than the federal courts. As Rebecca Sharpless pointed out, the court in declined to address Chaidezs two additional arguments: 1) Teagues analysis does not apply because she, unlike Teague, had a federal rather than a state conviction; and 2) new rules apply in post-conviction proceedings raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims because such claims cannot be brought on direct appeal. The Court thus applied Teague for the first in a federal case, but it did so without ruling that Teague should apply, leaving the question open for future litigation. Moreover, both state and federal litigants can still take up Chaidezs argument that new rules apply in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that must be brought on post-conviction rather than direct appeal. Rebecca Sharpless, Chaidez V. U.S.: Assuming Teague Applies, Padilla Announced A New Rule (2/22/13), http://crimmigration.com/2013/02/22/chaidez-v-us--assuming-teague-applies-padilla-announced--a-new-rule.aspx. Since these two arguments were not properly preserved and presented in Chaidez, the Supreme Court did not decide them. Therefore, counsel are free to argue: (1) Teague does not apply in state proceedings, unless the state has independently chosen to follow the Teague rule. (2) New rules apply in post-conviction proceedings raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims because such claims cannot be brought on direct appeal. Chaidez does not apply to review of state claims under state authority. It held merely that Padilla does not apply to cases already final on March 31, 2010, when it was decided. Favorable state authority decided prior to Padilla holding defense counsels failure to advise, or affirmative misadvice, concerning adverse immigration consequences of a plea such as that in California, remains intact. This is particularly important in California, where state authority condemned failure to advise as ineffective assistance of counsel has existed since 1987. Following the rule set forth in People v. Soriano, a California Court of Appeals panel in 1989 made explicit what was only implicit in Soriano: the duty to advise about immigration consequences also includes the duty to defend against those consequences. People v. Barocio, (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 99 (failure to file judicial recommendation against deportation or seek 364 day sentence is ineffective assistance of counsel). This was also the holding in People v. Bautista (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 229 (counsel correctly told the defendant that he would be deported for possession of sale conviction, but failure to attempt to plead up to offer to sell or transportation may be ineffective assistance of counsel). This prior authority does not depend on Padilla, and so remains useful even though Padilla itself does not apply to cases already final when it was decided.