In federal court, coram nobis may be used to raise any ground of fundamental legal invalidity.

 

            Coram nobis is a judicially-created remedy to secure relief from a judgment which was rendered by the court in ignorance of a fact which (a) does not go to guilt or innocence, but (b) if known by the court would have prevented the judgment.  The purpose of the writ is to provide a remedy, where none is otherwise available, against a judgment that was procured under circumstances that offend fundamental concepts of justice such as the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Chapter 5, supra.

 

            While this procedural vehicle has traditionally been used to attack the entire conviction, under the reasoning of decisions such as Wiedersperg[177] it is possible to use it to attack the sentence alone, where the effect of the unknown fact would not have been to prevent the entire judgment, but only to prevent the sentence.  This would seem to be the case, for example, where a sentence of one year in county jail resulted in a deportable aggravated felony conviction, but where — if counsel had been aware of the defendant’s immigration situation — counsel would have entered the same plea, but attempted, with a reasonable chance of success, to obtain a sentence of less than one year in custody.  This same reasoning has been used in habeas corpus proceedings, in which counsel’s error would not have invalidated the conviction itself, but merely the sentence.[178]

 

            A recent case held that an attack on a conviction for violation of a state advisal statute[179] was equivalent to a petition for a writ of coram nobis and was subject to the procedural requirements of that cause of action.[180]  The preferred manner of raising a claim of violation of a state advisal statute, however, is a motion to vacate the plea for violation of the statute.  See Chapter 5, supra.

 

            Other grounds may exist in which the prejudice would invalidate the sentence, but not the conviction, as where the judge was unaware that the defendant was mentally incapacitated when sentence was imposed, but not when the plea was entered, or where the sentence was entered in violation of a state official’s broken promise.[181]

[177] People v. Wiedersperg, 44 Cal.App.3d 550, 118 Cal.Rptr. 755 (1975).

[178] See People v. Barocio, 216 Cal.App.3d 99 (1989).

[179] California Penal Code § 1016.5.

[180] People v. Castaneda, 37 Cal.App.4th 1612, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 666 (1995).  See Chapter 6, supra.

[181] People v. Shipman, supra (incapacitation); People v. Wadkins, 63 Cal.2d 110, 113, 45 Cal.Rptr. 173 (1965) (fraudulent inducement); People v. Chaklader, 24 Cal.App.4th 407, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 344 (1994) (defendant’s hope that later federal sentence would be concurrent insufficient to establish grounds for coram nobis relief); People v. Wadkins, 63 Cal.2d 110, 113, 45 Cal.Rptr. 173 (1965) (coram nobis appropriate where guilty plea is induced by mistake, fraud or coercion); Appeals and Writs in Criminal Cases, § 2.151 (C.E.B. 2003); People v. Gilbert, 25 Cal.2d 422, 443, 154 P.2d 657 (1944) (defendant’s reliance must be in good faith and without negligence on his part); People v. Abdullah, 6 Cal.App.4th 1728, 1737, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 131 (1992) (defendant hoped to be placed in federal custody but was not told this was more than a mere possibility); People v. Goodrum, 228 Cal.App.3d 397, 401, 279 Cal.Rptr. 120 (1991) (defendant must show a reasonable person in his situation would have pleaded differently if more fully advised of consequences).

Lower Courts of Fourth Circuit

POST CON RELIEF - VIRGINIA - CORAM VOBIS - SENTENCE REDUCTION GRANTED FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES AFTER CUSTODY EXPIRED SINCE DEFENDANT HAD NO REASON TO SUSPECT THE PROBLEM EARLIER - INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL - AFFIRMATIVE MISADVICE
Commonwealth v. Mohamed, 71 Va. Cir. 383, 2006 WL 2388632 (Aug. 18, 2006) (granting writ of coram vobis, reducing sentence from two years to 360 days, thereby entitling petitioner to discretionary relief in the immigration courts, after custody had expired, since petitioner had no reason to suspect the advice was faulty any earlier than when he was placed into removal proceedings upon returning to the United States).