The first requirement is that the habeas action be timely filed.  In federal court, this means complying with a one-year statute of limitations, while in California, a doctrine of laches applies.

Other

CAL POST CON " VEHICLES " HABEAS CORPUS " TIMELINESS " LEGAL STANDARD
In re Douglas, 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 586 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2011) (For noncapital cases in California, there is no express time window in which a petitioner must seek habeas relief. (In re Huddleston (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1031, 1034.) Rather, the general rule is that the petition must be filed as promptly as the circumstances allow.... (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 765, fn. 5 (Clark ).) An untimely petition for writ of habeas corpus may still be considered if the delay is justified by the petitioner, who bears the burden of demonstrating either: (i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness. (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 (Robbins ).).

CAL POST CON " VEHICLES " HABEAS CORPUS " TIMELINESS
In re Douglas, 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 586 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2011) (Substantial delay is measured from the time the petitioner or his ... counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim.); quoting In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780; citing In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 765, fn. 5; but see In re Crockett (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 751, 757"758 (habeas petition deemed timely because the legal claim was not apparent until new case law was published; thus, timeliness was not measured from 2001 (the time at which the petitioner became aware of the registration requirement), but from 2006 (when the new case law giving rise to the legal claim was published).

CAL POST CON " VEHICLES " HABEAS CORPUS " TIMELINESS
In re Douglas, 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 586 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2011) (A petition that has been substantially delayed may nevertheless be considered on the merits if the petitioner can establish good cause for the delay, such as investigation of a potentially meritorious claim, or to avoid the piecemeal presentation of claims.); citing In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780.

CAL POST CON " VEHICLES " HABEAS CORPUS " TIMELINESS
In re Douglas, 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 586 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2011) (The only excuse Defendant offers to explain the delay between conviction in 1997 and this petition in 2010 is his mistaken belief regarding the registration requirement. California law does not condone willful ignorance: A petitioner will be expected to demonstrate due diligence in pursuing potential claims. If a petitioner had reason to suspect that a basis for habeas corpus relief was available, but did nothing to promptly confirm those suspicions, that failure must be justified.); quoting In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 775.

CAL POST CON " VEHICLES " HABEAS CORPUS " TIMELINESS
In re Douglas, 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 588 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2011) (A petition for writ of habeas corpus that is substantially delayed without good cause is considered untimely and will not be considered on the merits unless the defects alleged by petitioner constitute a fundamental miscarriage of justice . . . which has previously been defined as one of the following: (1) that error of constitutional magnitude led to a trial that was so fundamentally unfair that absent the error no reasonable judge or jury would have convicted the petitioner; (2) that the petitioner is actually innocent of the crime or crimes of which he was convicted; (3) that the death penalty was imposed [based on grossly misleading information and] that absent the error or omission no reasonable judge or jury would have imposed a sentence of death; or (4) that the petitioner was convicted under an invalid statute.); quoting In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 759.

CAL POST CON " VEHICLES " HABEAS CORPUS " TIMELINESS
In re Douglas, 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 588 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2011) (Though the trial court erred [in failing to advise the defendant of the sex offender registration requirement before plea], Defendant was almost instantly aware of the error when he signed the registration advisal form and received verbal notification on December 19, 1997. Despite this notice, Defendant chose to take no action for over a decade, and has thus forfeited his right to contest the error. While we recognize there may be advisements and rights so fundamental that the application of forfeiture doctrine is inappropriate, here we find the application reasonable and warranted. Defendant's deliberate inactivity for over a decade forfeited his right to challenge the Bunnell error.).

CAL POST CON " VEHICLES " HABEAS CORPUS " LACHES
In re Douglas, 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 588-89 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2011) (Moreover, unreasonable delay also bars consideration of a petition for writ of habeas corpus under the doctrine of laches. (People v. Miller, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 881-882.) Application of the doctrine is appropriate where the delay is unreasonable and has prejudiced respondent. (Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Cal.3d 614, 624.)).

CAL POST CON " VEHICLES " HABEAS CORPUS " LACHES
In re Douglas, 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 589 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2011) (the California prejudice requirement of laches reflects recognition that a substantial delay will prejudice the respondent's ability to answer the petition, respects the importance of finality of judgments to the state, and recognizes the difficulty of retrial in the event that a judgment is set aside on habeas corpus many years after the conviction.); quoting In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 787; distinguishing Gratzer v. Mahoney (9th Cir. 2005) 397 F.3d 686, 690 (the Ninth Circuit found it irrelevant under federal law to the habeas corpus timeliness prejudice analysis that it would be impossible for the state to re-prosecute the petitioner for a crime that occurred over 20 years ago).

CAL POST CON " VEHICLES " HABEAS CORPUS " LACHES
In re Douglas, 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 589 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2011) (The Supreme Court has recognized that when a habeas petitioner succeeds in obtaining a new trial, the erosion of memory and dispersion of witnesses that occur with the passage of time, [citation], prejudice the government and diminish the chances of a reliable criminal adjudication.); quoting McCleskey v. Zant (1991) 499 U.S. 467, 491.

CAL POST CON " HABEAS " CURRENT CUSTODY GIVES JURISDICTION TO ATTACK EXPIRED CUSTODY PRIOR CONVICTION ON WHICH CURRENT CUSTODY DEPENDS
Custody for habeas on the basis of incarceration for failure to register A habeas petitioner incarcerated for failing to comply with a state sex offender registration law is in custody for the purpose of challenging the prior conviction that led the imposition of the registration requirement. Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner filing a habeas claim on an expired prior conviction must show that he or she bore no responsibility for the delay in filing. Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403 (2001). I. Custody on the basis of incarceration for failure to register a. Custody For a federal court to have jurisdiction over a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner, the petitioner must be in custody. See, e.g., Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887, 888 (9th Cir. 1994.) In general, a states sexual offender registration laws do not render a habeas petitioner in custody because they are a collateral consequence of conviction that do not impose a severe restraint on an individuals liberty. In re Stier, 152 Cal.App.4th 63, 83 (2007) (citing Resendiz v. Kovensky 416 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., McNab v. Kok, 170 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 1999); Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1999.) Though merely being subject to the sex offender registry requirement alone does not satisfy custody for the purposes of habeas relief, the Ninth Circuit has held that incarceration for failure to register as a sex offender does establish custody for 2254 and 2255 habeas relief from the initial conviction that led to the registration requirement. Zichko, 247 F.3d at 1020. In Zichko v. Idaho, the petitioner pleaded guilty to rape and was sentenced to ten years in prison, but served seven. Two years after he was released, he was incarcerated for failing to register as a sex offender. 247 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001). He subsequently filed a habeas petition with the federal district court, alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel in his rape case. His original sentence would have ended less than a month before he filed the habeas petition. The court ultimately denied the habeas petition on the grounds of state procedural default. Id. at 1021. But the Ninth Circuit first noted that, though the initial rape conviction had expired, Zichko was subject to the registration requirement only because of that initial conviction. Id. 1020. Accordingly, the court held that a habeas petitioner is in custody for the purposes of challenging an earlier, expired rape conviction, when he is incarcerated for failing to comply with a state sex offender registration law because the earlier rape conviction is a necessary predicate to the failure to register charge. Id. at 1019 (citing Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1994)). The court drew support for its reasoning from the well settled proposition that a habeas corpus petitioner meets the statutory in custody requirements when, at the time he files the petition [] . . . he is in custody pursuant to another conviction that is positively and demonstrably related to the conviction he attacks. Carter v. Procunier, 755 F.2d 1126, 1129 (5th Cir. 1985). See also Lackawanna County Dist. Atty. v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001) (Lackawanna) (holding that petitioner was in custody for jurisdictional purposes because he alleged that the earlier, unconstitutional conviction had enhanced his later sentence); Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887, 890 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that the habeas petitioner could challenge an earlier expired conviction while involuntarily committed for treatment as a violent sexual predator). Though California state cases have yet to issue holdings on the issue, the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals cases have made clear that custody for failure to register can be used to challenge the constitutionality of the original conviction. b. Timely challenge In federal habeas proceedings, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that if . . . a prior conviction used to enhance a federal sentence is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), then that defendant . . . may not collaterally attack his prior conviction through a habeas petition related to his current conviction. Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 402 (quoting Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 382 (2001)). Nevertheless, it is possible that, even if the petitioner satisfies the custody requirement, a court could determine that the petition is untimely raised and could decline to review it on the merits.

CAL POST CON " HABEAS " CURRENT CUSTODY GIVES JURISDICTION TO ATTACK EXPIRED CUSTODY PRIOR CONVICTION ON WHICH CURRENT CUSTODY DEPENDS
Custody for habeas on the basis of incarceration for failure to register A habeas petitioner incarcerated for failing to comply with a state sex offender registration law is in custody for the purpose of challenging the prior conviction that led the imposition of the registration requirement. Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner filing a habeas claim on an expired prior conviction must show that he or she bore no responsibility for the delay in filing. Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403 (2001). I. Custody on the basis of incarceration for failure to register a. Custody For a federal court to have jurisdiction over a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner, the petitioner must be in custody. See, e.g., Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887, 888 (9th Cir. 1994.) In general, a states sexual offender registration laws do not render a habeas petitioner in custody because they are a collateral consequence of conviction that do not impose a severe restraint on an individuals liberty. In re Stier, 152 Cal.App.4th 63, 83 (2007) (citing Resendiz v. Kovensky 416 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., McNab v. Kok, 170 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 1999); Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1999.) Though merely being subject to the sex offender registry requirement alone does not satisfy custody for the purposes of habeas relief, the Ninth Circuit has held that incarceration for failure to register as a sex offender does establish custody for 2254 and 2255 habeas relief from the initial conviction that led to the registration requirement. Zichko, 247 F.3d at 1020. In Zichko v. Idaho, the petitioner pleaded guilty to rape and was sentenced to ten years in prison, but served seven. Two years after he was released, he was incarcerated for failing to register as a sex offender. 247 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001). He subsequently filed a habeas petition with the federal district court, alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel in his rape case. His original sentence would have ended less than a month before he filed the habeas petition. The court ultimately denied the habeas petition on the grounds of state procedural default. Id. at 1021. But the Ninth Circuit first noted that, though the initial rape conviction had expired, Zichko was subject to the registration requirement only because of that initial conviction. Id. 1020. Accordingly, the court held that a habeas petitioner is in custody for the purposes of challenging an earlier, expired rape conviction, when he is incarcerated for failing to comply with a state sex offender registration law because the earlier rape conviction is a necessary predicate to the failure to register charge. Id. at 1019 (citing Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1994)). The court drew support for its reasoning from the well settled proposition that a habeas corpus petitioner meets the statutory in custody requirements when, at the time he files the petition [] . . . he is in custody pursuant to another conviction that is positively and demonstrably related to the conviction he attacks. Carter v. Procunier, 755 F.2d 1126, 1129 (5th Cir. 1985). See also Lackawanna County Dist. Atty. v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001) (Lackawanna) (holding that petitioner was in custody for jurisdictional purposes because he alleged that the earlier, unconstitutional conviction had enhanced his later sentence); Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887, 890 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that the habeas petitioner could challenge an earlier expired conviction while involuntarily committed for treatment as a violent sexual predator). Though California state cases have yet to issue holdings on the issue, the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals cases have made clear that custody for failure to register can be used to challenge the constitutionality of the original conviction. b. Timely challenge In federal habeas proceedings, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that if . . . a prior conviction used to enhance a federal sentence is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), then that defendant . . . may not collaterally attack his prior conviction through a habeas petition related to his current conviction. Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 402 (quoting Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 382 (2001)). Nevertheless, it is possible that, even if the petitioner satisfies the custody requirement, a court could determine that the petition is untimely raised and could decline to review it on the merits. In Lackawanna, though the petitioner was no longer serving the sentence imposed pursuant to his initial conviction, the Court found that the fact that the petitioners current sentence was enhanced by the allegedly unconstitutional prior conviction satisfied the in custody requirement for the purposes of section 2255 and 2254 habeas relief. Id. at 401-02. The Court went on to hold, however, that it would not review the merits of the petition, reasoning: [O]nce a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid. If that conviction is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence through a petition under 2254 on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained. Id. at 403-04. An exception to this general rule exists if the petitioner can establish that he or she bore no responsibility for failing to obtain timely review of the constitutional claim. In such cases, a habeas petition directed at the enhanced sentence may effectively be the first and only forum available for review of the prior conviction. Id. at 406. The Supreme Court gave the specific examples of a state courts unjustified refusal to rule on a constitutional claim, or a defendant who, after the time for direct or collateral review expired, obtained compelling evidence of actual innocence. Id. at 405. Cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83; 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2)(B) (allowing a second or successive habeas corpus application if the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and . . . the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense). Accordingly, a habeas petitioner who seeks to challenge his custody on the basis of an allegedly unconstitutional prior conviction must show that the petitioner bore no responsibility for the delay in challenging the conviction.