Crimes of Moral Turpitude

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§ 3.43 (A)

 





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(A)  
Brief History of INA §  212(c).  Prior to November 29, 1990, a waiver of inadmissibility under INA §  212(c) was generally available to noncitizens who:
  
 
  
(1)    had been lawfully admitted for permanent residence;[489]
  
(2)    had temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation; and
  
(3)    were returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years in the United States. 
  
 
  
In addition to these eligibility requirements, the noncitizen was also required to establish that s/he merited the favorable exercise of discretion in order to obtain the waiver.[490]  A conviction waived under INA §  212(c) will no longer constitute a ground of removal, although the DHS may join a conviction for a crime of moral turpitude that has been waived with another that has not, to establish deportability for conviction of two CMT offenses.[491]
  
 
  
This relief was also available to lawful[492] permanent residents who had not departed the United States, but were in deportation proceedings,[493] but only to noncitizens found deportable under a charge of deportability for which there was a comparable ground of excludability.[494]  
  
After the passage of the Immigration Act of 1990,[495] INA §  212(c) relief was no longer available to a noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony and who had actually served five years in prison.  This was soon amended to bar a noncitizen convicted of one or more aggravated felonies for which s/he actually served an aggregate of five years in prison.[496]
  
 
  
Additional limitations on eligibility for §  212(c) relief were imposed by AEDPA on April 24, 1996.[497]  Section 440(d) of AEDPA eliminated availability of §  212(c) relief to noncitizens who were “deportable by reason of having committed any criminal offense covered in §  241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) or any offense covered by §  241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are, without regard to the date of their commission, otherwise covered by §  241(a)(i) (A).”  Therefore, after April 24, 1996, §  212(c) was available to waive only:
  
 
  
·        excludability for a single crime of moral turpitude;
  
·        deportability for conviction of one crime involving moral turpitude, committed within five years of admission; or 
  
·        deportability for convictions of two or more crimes of moral turpitude where only one or none carried a potential maximum sentence of one year or more.[498]  
  
·        any other ground of deportation — other than those specifically barred by the AEDPA amendment to §  212(c) — for which there is a parallel ground of inadmissibility.[499]  
  
 
  
Effective on April 1, 1997, §  212(c) of the Act was repealed in its entirety, and replaced by cancellation of removal for lawful permanent residents under INA §  240A(a).  
  
 
  
            On June 25, 2001, the Supreme Court held that the repeal of §  212(c) could not be applied retroactively to the appellant who was presumed to rely upon the availability of §  212(c) relief, when s/he entered a plea agreement or plea of guilty prior to April 1, 1997, and had already accrued seven years of unrelinquished domicile in the United States.[500]  St. Cyr makes §  212(c) relief available to noncitizens in removal proceedings, as well as to those in deportation or exclusion proceedings.   Regulations interpreting St. Cyr were issued on September 28, 2004.[501] 
  
        
[489] See INA §  212(c), 8 U.S.C. §  1182(c) (1990).  See also Savoury v. United States Att’y Gen., 449 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. May 25, 2006) (noncitizen granted LPR status by mistake of DHS, where noncitizen was inadmissible at the time of adjustment, is not a lawful permanent resident for purposes of INA §  212(c) eligibility); Arellano-Garcia v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1183 (8th Cir. Dec. 7, 2005) (where DHS erroneously granted LPR status to noncitizen who had prior controlled substance/aggravated felony conviction, noncitizen was ineligible for INA §  212(c) relief in removal proceedings).
    
[490] Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581 (BIA 1978).  See generally Immigrant Legal Resource Center, Winning a 212(c) Case (1995); National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, Immigration Law and Defense §  8.5 (2003);.  
    
[491] Becker v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. Jan. 10, 2007) (“This is because ‘the grant of section 212(c) relief merely waives the finding of deportability rather than the basis of the deportability itself. Therefore, the crimes alleged to be grounds for deportability do not disappear from the alien’s record for immigration purposes.’”); Molina-Amecua v. INS, 6 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 1993); Molenda v. INS, 998 F.2d 291, 294-95 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); Comas v. McDonough, No. Civ.A. 04-10691-PBS (D. Mass. Mar. 23, 2005) (unpublished); Matter of Balderas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 389 (BIA 1990).
    
[492] But see, De La Rosa v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 489 F.3d 551 (2d Cir. Jun. 13, 2007) (a lawful permanent resident who has procured her status by fraud or mistake has not been "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" for purposes of section 212(c)).
    
[493] See Ashby v. INS, 961 F.2d 555, 557 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992); Mantell v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 798 F.2d 124, 125 n.2 (5th Cir. 1986); Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976); Matter of Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30 (BIA 1976).
    
[494] See, e.g., Matter of Brevia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766 (BIA 2006), afford, Brita-Perez v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2007) (deportation proceedings begun in February, 2003, on the basis of a 1995 conviction of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle: eight-year delay); Matter of Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722 (BIA 2005).  But see Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007) (disagreeing with Matter of Blake); Matter of Azure, 23 I. & N. Dec. 695 (BIA 2005) (LPR seeking 212(c) in conjunction with application for new green card does not need to show comparable grounds).
    
[495] Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (Nov. 29, 1990).
    
[496] See N. Tooby & J. Rollin, Criminal Defense of Immigrants §  24.28(E) (4th Ed. 2007). 
    
[497] Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996).
    
[498] Cf. Alberto-Gonzalez v. INS, 215 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding the multiple CMT ground of deportation had not been established since a one-year sentence had not been imposed on each of the two convictions, as required under the law in effect when the deportation proceedings were begun).
    
[499] See N. Tooby & J. Rollin, Criminal Defense of Immigrants §  24.28(C) (4th Ed. 2007).
    
[500] INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 2275 (2001).
    
[501] 8 C.F.R. § §  1003.44, 1212.3, 1240.1.

  



Updates
 
	




                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF " INA  212(c) WAIVER " COMPARABLE GROUNDS

                      Judulang v. Holder, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 476 (Dec. 12, 2011) (the comparable grounds test applied by the BIA in Matter of Blake is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5  U. S. C.  706(2)(A); noncitizens in deportation proceedings are eligible for relief under INA  212(c) if otherwise qualifying conviction triggers some waivable ground of inadmissibility).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF " WAIVERS " 212(c) RELIEF " TRIAL BAR " JUDULANG

                      In Judulang, the Court rejected a rule that categorically excluded a group of deportable
LPRs on grounds that bore no relationship to the aliens fitness to remain in the country. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. """", """", 132 S.Ct. 476, 485, 181 L.Ed.2d 449 (2011). Op. at 12. Categorical exclusion of trial conviction cases also bears no relationship to fitness to remain. Indeed, the agency has never claimed that it bore such a relationship. Instead, trial conviction cases have been excluded from relief on the ground that St. Cyr does not require that they be included. See, e.g., Canto v. Holder, 593 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010). That logic is almost identical to the logic that led to the Blake decision. The agency had been ordered by a court to provide  212(c) to some deportable immigrants and did not extend  212(c) to others whom it deemed not covered by St. Cyr. But as the Court found in Judulang, agency practice cannot allow for distinctions that are arbitrary just because they grew out of an accommodation of case law. Instead, access to a critical form of relief must be based on a connection to the broader purpose of the statute and fitness to remain. Moreover, just as the comparable grounds test lacked any connection to the text of the statute, the exclusion of trial convictions finds no basis whatsoever in the wording of  212(c).


                    


                  
BIA


                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF " WAIVERS " 212(C) RELIEF " TRIAL 

                      Matter of Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254 (BIA 2014) (a lawful permanent resident otherwise eligible for relief under former INA  212(c) is eligible without regard to whether the conviction resulted from a plea agreement or a trial, and without regard to whether he or she was removable or deportable under the law in effect when the conviction was entered).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF " WAIVERS " 212(C) RELIEF " TRIAL 

                      Matter of Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254 (BIA 2014) (a lawful permanent resident otherwise eligible for relief under former INA  212(c) is eligible without regard to whether the conviction resulted from a plea agreement or a trial, and without regard to whether he or she was removable or deportable under the law in effect when the conviction was entered).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF " WAIVERS " 212(C) RELIEF

                      Matter of Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254 (BIA 2014) (an LPR with 7 years domicile in the United States who is removable due to a conviction between November 29, 1990 and April 24, 1996, is eligible for former INA  212(c) relief, inadmissible under INA  212(a)(3)(A), (B), (C), (E), or 212(a)(10)(C), 8 U.S.C.  1182(a)(3)(A), (B), (C), (E), or (10)(C) (2012); or served five years jail, in aggregate because of one or more aggravated felony convictions).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      WAIVERS - 212(C) WAIVERS - DATE OF PLEA AGREEMENT, NOT DATE OF SENTENCE, GOVERNS ELIGIBILITY FOR 212(C) RELIEF

                      Matter of Moreno-Escobosa, 25 I. & N. Dec. 114 (BIA Oct. 30, 2009) (the date of a plea agreement, rather than the date of sentencing, is controlling in determining whether a person is eligible for a waiver under former INA  212(c), 8 U.S.C.  1182(c)). 


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      WAIVERS - 212(C) WAIVERS - ABEBE DOES NOT INVALIDATE REGULATION ALLOWING 212(C) WAIVERS OF GROUNDS OF DEPORTATION

                      Matter of Moreno-Escobosa, 25 I. & N. Dec. 114 (BIA Oct. 30, 2009) (Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009), does not invalidate 8 C.F.R.  1212.3, so as to preclude a person who seeks to waive a deportation ground from establishing eligibility for a waiver under former INA  212(c)).

                    


                  


                    
                    
                    
 
                      

                      
                    


                  
First Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF - WAIVERS - 212(C) RELIEF - NUNC PRO TUNC

                      Nadal-Ginard v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 456411 (1st Cir. Feb. 25, 2009 (
(affirming BIA denial of request to allow INA  212(c) waiver nunc pro tunc; distinguishing Matter of L, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1 (A.G. 1940) on the basis that: (1) crime in this case was much more serious, and BIA was not unreasonable to deny "equitable relief" of nunc pro tunc grant of 212(c); and (2) by leaving the country in 2004 the appellant took "an action that he knew or should have known would render him excludable or deportable without the statutory right to apply for discretionary relief.").  See also, Fernandes Pereira v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 38, 43 & n. 4 (1st Cir.2005) (describing a request to apply for  212(c) relief nunc pro tunc as an "equitable argument"); see also Fernandes Pereira v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 11, 11 (1st Cir.2006) (Lipez, J., dissenting) (describing nunc pro tunc relief as "equitable relief").


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF - WAIVERS - 212(C) RELIEF - JURY TRIAL

                      Nadal-Ginard v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 456411 (1st Cir. Feb. 25, 2009 (INA  212(c) nor impermissibly retroactive under St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347, where defendant chose to go to trial), following Dias v. INS, 311 F.3d 456 (1st Cir.2002).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF - 212(C) RELIEF - BLAKE COMPARABLE GROUNDS

                      Gonzalez-Mesias v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. Jun.18, 2008) (212(c) relief unavailable to waive aggravated felony sexual abuse of a minor or crime of violence; court indicated that BIA would not follow Blake v. Carbone outside the second circuit), following Dalombo Fontes v. Gonzales, 483 F.3d 115 (1st Cir. 2007) ; Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2006), disagreeing with Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007).

                    


                  
Second Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF - NATURALIZATION - INA  212(c) WAIVER

                      Ljutica v. Holder, 588 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. Dec. 3, 2009) (grant of a waiver under INA  212(c) does not prevent the waived conviction from barring naturalization as an aggravated felony).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF - WAIVERS - 212(C) RELIEF - OSC

                      Garcia-Padron v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 468202 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 2009) (noncitizen in pre-IIRAIRA proceeding after service of OSC is eligible to waive post-IIRAIRA convictions under INA  212(c), despite pre-conviction repeal and even though proceedings had been administratively closed and then reopened; interpreting IIRAIRA  309(c)).

                    


                  
Third Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF " WAIVERS " INA  212(h) WAIVER " CONDITIONAL PERMANENT RESIDENT

                      
Paek v. Attorney General of the US, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 4393910 (3d Cir. Jul. 20, 2015) (INA  212(h) waiving unavailable to noncitizen who committed aggravated felony after admission as a Conditional LPR, since an alien admitted as a lawful permanent resident on a conditional basis qualifies as "an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence" for purposes of the aggravated felony bar to INA  212(h) relief).

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF " 212(c) RELIEF 

                      Duhaney v. Attorney General, 621 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. Sept. 14, 2010), cert. denied (2011) (the government was not precluded, by res judicata, from charging respondent with removal in new proceedings based upon (1) convictions that existed at the time of the original proceedings, and that were known to the government, but that the government chose not to allege at the original proceedings, or (2) a conviction previously waived under INA  212(c) that became an aggravated felony after the termination of the original proceedings). 
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF - WAIVERS - 212(c) RELIEF - APPLICANT NOT LAWFULLY ADMITTED AS LPR IF LATER DETERMINED TO HAVE BEEN INELIGIBLE AT THE TIME OF OBTAINING THAT STATUS

                      Gallimore v. Attorney General, 619 F.3d 216, 224-225 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 2010) (an alien whose status has been adjusted to lawful permanent resident but who is later determined in an immigration proceeding to have originally been ineligible for that status has not been "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" for purposes of eligibility for a waiver under former INA  212(c)); following De La Rosa v. DHS, 489 F.3d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 2007).


                    


                  
Fifth Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF " WAIVERS " INA  212(C) RELIEF " RETROACTIVITY

                      Carranza-De Salinas v. Holder, 700 F.3d 768, *772 (5th Cir. Nov. 6, 2012) (noncitizen convicted by jury trial of an aggravated felony prior to the repeal of former INA  212(c) is eligible to apply for the relief under St. Cyr., even though she was found guilty by a jury; [I]n light of Vartelas, Carranza may invoke the presumption against the retroactive application of statutes. Because she has demonstrated the kind of reliance described by the Court in Vartelas, namely a likelihood of reliance on prior law, see 132 S.Ct. at 1491, she is entitled to argue that IIRIRA's repeal of  212(c) relief may not be retroactively applied to her.).

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF " WAIVERS " INA  212(c)

                      
Enriquez-Gutierrez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. Jul. 16, 2010) (noncitizen cannot be found removable for an offense that was waived in prior immigration proceedings by grant of INA  212(c) relief; government failed to establish that respondent had stipulated in the original proceedings that the offense would not be waived).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      PETITION FOR REVIEW " RELIEF " INA  212(c)

                      Enriquez-Gutierrez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. Jul. 16, 2010) (a waiver under INA  212(c) may be used to waive a post-IIRAIRA conviction if the proceedings in which the waiver is sought began prior to April 1, 1997), agreeing with Garcia-Padron v. Holder, 558 F.3d 196 (2d Cir.2009).


                    


                  
Sixth Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF - INA  212(c) - JURY TRIAL

                      Kellerman v. Holder, 592 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. Jan. 25, 2010) (noncitizen convicted by jury trial ineligible for INA  212(c) relief under St. Cyr).

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF - WAIVERS - 212(C) RELIEF - COMPARABLE GROUNDS

                      Koussan v. Holder, 556 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. Feb. 12, 2009) (INA  237(a)(3)(A)(ii) (violation of 18 U.S.C.  1546, fraud & misuse of entry documents, is not a "comparable" to INA  212(a)(6)(C)(1), misrepresentation to obtain entry document, for purposes of making an application for relief under former INA  212(c) in deportation proceedings), following Matter of Jimenez-Santillano, 21 I & N Dec. 567 (BIA 1996).


                    


                  
Seventh Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF " 212(c) WAIVER " TRIAL CONVICTION

                      Khodja v. Holder, 666 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. Dec. 12, 2011) (waiver under INA  212(c) was available to applicant who was found guilty following jury trial prior to April 1, 1997, where applicant was able to show actual reliance on the availability of a  212(c) by showing that he had affirmatively abandoned his right to pursue a Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation; INS attorney showed up at the JRAD criminal sentencing hearing, described the 212(c) hearing process, and argued that the waiver was best left to the federal immigration judge; the state court agreed and denied the JRAD; after the denial, his defense attorney withdrew the JRAD motion).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF " WAIVERS " 212(c) RELIEF

                      
Torres-Rendon v. Holder, 656 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. Aug. 23, 2011) (lawful permanent resident who obtained that status as a result of a bigamous marriage was not eligible for a waiver of deportation under former INA 212(c) because he was not lawfully admitted to permanent residence).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF " WAIVERS " 212(c) RELIEF

                      
Torres-Rendon v. Holder, 656 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. Aug. 23, 2011) (a waiver of the fraud under former INA 241(f) applies only to those inadmissible on grounds of fraud; respondent was inadmissible on grounds of a controlled substance conviction); citing Matter of Sosa"Hernandez, 20 I. & N. Dec. 758, 760"61 (BIA 1993) (a waiver under INA  241(f) waives not only deportability but also the underlying fraud, thereby validating the applicant's lawful permanent resident status and making him theoretically eligible for a  212(c) waiver).

NOTE: The courts reasoning is arguably faulty.  In Sosa-Hernandez, the INS never charged the respondent with fraud, only with deportability for having been convicted of a controlled substance offense.  In addition to finding deportability as charged for the drug trafficking offense, the IJ found sua sponte that he was excludable for fraud at the time of his entry as a LPR.  See Matter of Sosa-Hernandez, 20 I&N Dec. 758, 759 (BIA 1993).  Thus, the procedural posture of Sosa-Hernandez lines up with Torres: in both cases, there was commission of fraud at the time of entry as a LPR, the respondent was convicted for drug trafficking, and charged only with deportability for the drug offense, and IJ found an additional ground of deportability.
 
In Torres, the IJ found that he was inadmissible for fraud in 2009 when he returned from a trip abroad; the BIA reversed that part of the IJ's decision and agreed that he was excludable in 1984 at the time of his entry.  The BIA's reasoning for avoiding a direct application of Sosa-Hernandez was abominable:  in Torres, the DHS challenged his eligibility for a 241(f) waiver and refused to charge him with an I-261 for the fraud ground.  Thus, because DHS never charged him formally with being excludable at the time of entry in 1984 (before he pled guilty to drug trafficking), he does not qualify for a 241(f) waiver even though both the IJ and the BIA agreed that he had committed fraud as noted above.
Thanks to Maria Baldini-Potermin.


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF " WAVIER UNDER INA  212(c) " MATTER OF BLAKE JUDICIAL REVIEW " ACTIONS OF DHS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

                      Frederick v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 1642811 (7th Cir. May 3, 2011) (Illinois aggravated felony sexual abuse of minor convictions did not have statutory counterpart to ground of inadmissibility, so noncitizen was not eligible for waiver of deportation under former INA  212(c); court lacks jurisdiction, under 8 U.S.C.  1252(g) ([N]o court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.), to address issue of whether DHS decision to charge respondent for an aggravated felony, rather than for two crimes of moral turpitude, violates equal protection).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF - WAIVERS - 212(c) RELIEF

                      Mancillas-Ruiz v. Holder, 625 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. Aug. 11, 2010) (aggravated felony crime of violence category has no statutory counterpart under INA  212(a)).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF - INA  212(c) - GUILTY PLEA AND RELIANCE REQUIRED

                      Esquivel v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. Sept. 11, 2008) (former INA  212(c) relief unavailable to noncitizen who was convicted, by jury, of murder in 1981), following United States v. De Horta Garcia, 519 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir.2008) ("relief under  212(c) is not available to any alien whose removal proceeding began after repeal except to those who affirmatively abandoned rights or admitted guilt in reliance on  212(c) relief."); Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2004).

                    


                  
Eighth Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF " WAIVERS " 212(C) RELIEF " COMPARABLE GROUNDS 

                                                                        
Lovan v. Holder, 659 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. Oct. 13, 2011) (rejecting the comparable grounds doctrine as applied to a person who would have been eligible for  212(c) relief before the crime of conviction became an aggravated felony: Had Lovan traveled to Laos and returned after his 1991 conviction but before repeal, he would have been considered excludable based on a prior conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. See  212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (1994); In re Olquin"Rufino, 23 I. & N. Dec. 896, 897 (B.I.A.2006). If immigration officials had overlooked this criminal history and admitted him, he would have been eligible for  212(c) relief nunc pro tunc under In re G"A" as construed in Hernandez"Casillas. If that relief was granted, he could not have been deported based upon the same criminal conviction, without regard to the statutory counterpart analysis that was applied to aliens who did not travel in cases like Wadud. In re G"A", 7 I. & N. Dec. at 275. Rather than analyze the issue of retroactive effect in this manner, the BIA majority simply declared that it was free to apply the statutory counterpart doctrine as it has evolved in post-repeal cases. This was an error of law in applying St. Cyr ; accordingly, the agency should proceed to determine whether [Lovan] warrants a  212 waiver. Lovan I, 574 F.3d at 996.).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF - 212(C) RELIEF - AVAILABLE AFTER CONVICTION BY TRIAL

                      Lovan v. Holder, 574 F.3d 990 (8th Cir. Jul. 31, 2009) (St. Cyr applies to respondents who were convicted following a trial, so respondent is eligible for relief under former INA  212(c)); following Atkinson v. Attorney General, 479 F.3d 222, 230 (3d Cir. 2007) (non-citizen need not show "actual reliance" to seek relief under former INA  212(c); but see Carranza-De Salinas v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 200, 206-09 (5th Cir. 2007) (non-citizen convicted after trial must show actual reliance on the possibility of INA  212(c) relief to be eligible for that relief now); see also Wilson v. Gonzalez, 471 F.3d 111, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (INA  212(c) relief exists for individuals convicted after a trial only if they show actual reliance on the possibility of relief); Restrepo v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627, 631-40 (2d Cir. 2004) (same); Dias v. INS, 311 F.3d 456, 458 (1st Cir. 2002) (INA  212(c) relief is not available to individuals who were convicted after trial); Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2004) (same); Armendariz-Montoya v. Sonchik, 291 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2002) (same).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF - 212(C) RELIEF - BLAKE - LPR WHO WAS READMITTED, BUT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN MAY SEEK 212(C)

                      Lovan v. Holder, 574 F.3d 990 (8th Cir. Jul. 31, 2009) (strongly suggesting that an LPR who commits a CIMT, leaves the U.S. and is re-admitted, and is then put into immigration proceedings as an aggravated felon should be eligible for a waiver under INA  212(c), despite lack of a comparable ground, because the immigration authorities should not have re-admitted the LPR upon seeking readmission), citing In re G-A-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (B.I.A.1956); In re L-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1 (BIA 1940).

                    


                  
Ninth Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF " 212(c) WAIVER " JURY TRIAL

                      Cardenas-Delgado v. Holder, __ F.3d __ No. 11-72057 (9th Cir. 2013) (relief under former INA  212(c) is available to noncitizens who were convicted by jury trial; it is not required that the noncitizen establish reliance to show repeal of former INA  212(c) was impermissibly retroactive).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      WAIVERS " 212(C) RELIEF " FIVE YEARS SERVED BAR

                      Corpuz v. Holder, 697 F.3d 807, *814 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2012) (while time in pre-conviction civil confinement to determine competence to stand trial generally would not be included in the phrase term of imprisonment for purposes of former INA  212(c), such a period is considered part of the term of imprisonment where the defendant was given credit for time served on the basis of the civil confinement, but with limitations: The question is how this time should be counted. We conclude that time spent in civil psychiatric confinement that is credited against a defendant's sentence should be counted in a manner that allows us to approximate, as closely as possible, the time the defendant would have served in prison had he never been in civil psychiatric confinement. This means that we should determine a constructive good time credit for the period spent in civil confinement based on the degree to which the defendant accumulated good time credit while in prison. The period spent in pre-trial psychiatric confinement should be calculated as part of the defendant's term of imprisonment only after this constructive good time credit is taken into account.).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF"WAIVERS"212(C) WAIVER"JURY TRIAL CONVICTIONS

                      Peng v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1248, 1250-1251 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 2012) (The enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which repealed the waiver of deportation under Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA)  212(c), 8 U.S.C.  1182(c), does not affect the right of aliens to use the  212(c) waiver, when such aliens proceeded to trial and were convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude prior to the enactment of IIRIRA. Aliens charged with and convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude prior to the enactment of IIRIRA remain eligible for  212(c) relief, regardless of whether they pleaded guilty or proceeded to trial. Such aliens can demonstrate reasonable reliance on  212(c) prior to its repeal, because they may have acted differently had  212 relief not been possible at such time.).
	
NOTE:  This decision was made without reference to Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 1479 (Mar. 29, 2012), decided a week later. In Peng, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the prior cases that found that a noncitizen charged with a potential aggravated felony would not be able to show reliance on INA  212(c) if they proceeded to trial.

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF"WAIVERS"212(c) RELIEF"COMPARABILITY REQUIREMENT 

                      Rangel-Zuazo v. Holder, 2012 WL 432283 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2012) (unpublished) (granting petition for review of a final order of removal issued by the BIA in light of Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011), which required reversal of the BIA's conclusion that the petitioner was ineligible for a waiver under former INA  212(c) because he failed to meet the comparability requirement). 
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF " WAIVERS " 212(C) RELIEF " STIPULATED FACTS TRIAL IS EQUIVALENT TO A GUILTY PLEA FOR PURPOSES OF ELIGIBILITY FOR 212(C) RELIEF

                      Tyson v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 2012) (We agree with Tyson that the stipulated facts trial in this case is substantially equal to a guilty plea for the purpose of  212(c) relief. We hold that applying the repeal of  212(c) relief would produce an impermissible retroactive effect on Tyson, who was convicted pursuant to a stipulated facts agreement based on a reasonable expectation that it would not negatively affect her immigration status. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 319 (2001); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269-70 (1994). Because the BIA erred in its legal analysis of the effect of this stipulated facts trial, we reverse and remand with instructions to consider Tysons  212(c) application on the merits.).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF " WAIVERS " 212(C) RELIEF

                      
Luna v. Holder, 659 F.3d 753 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2011) (the April 26, 2005, deadline to seek a waiver of removal under former INA  212(c), 8 U.S.C.  1182(c), established by 8 C.F.R.  1003.44, is a constitutionally-sound procedural rule; absent some exceptional circumstances, not present here, petitioners that miss the deadline are not entitled to relief).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RELIEF " INA  212(c) WAIVER " DISCRETION

                      Zheng v. Holder, __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 1709849 (9th Cir. May 6, 2011) (BIA erred in failing to consider respondents significant service to the community as a positive factor, separate from rehabilitation, in determining whether to grant relief as a matter of discretion).