Crimes of Moral Turpitude

(E)

Ninth Circuit.  In reversing an earlier decision en banc, the Ninth Circuit found that to constitute a CMT, a crime must be both (1) inherently base, vile or depraved and (2) contrary to the accepted duties owed between man and society.[41]  Finally, criminal intent is required.[42] 

The first element, the court further defined as “involving some level of depravity or baseness so far contrary to moral law that it gives rise to moral outrage.”[43]  Thus, applying the minimum conduct analysis,[44] the court found that accessory after the fact was not necessarily a CMT, since the offense could be committed by giving any type of help to a known felon, including a mother providing food to her felon-child; an act that would not be considered base or depraved.  As to the second element, it is unclear whether the Ninth Circuit would view this as merely the requirement that the offense is a crime, or whether more is required.  For a discussion of intent, see § § 8.3-8.18, infra.

The Ninth Circuit has also defined crimes of moral turpitude as involving either those offenses involving grave acts of baseness or depravity or fraud,[45] thus suggesting that fraud offenses are subject to a different test altogether.  See § 8.6, infra.

The Ninth Circuit has further announced that it will treat this definition as if it were statutorily defined for purposes of applying the categorical and modified categorical approach to determine the nature of a statute of conviction.  However:

Because a “crime of moral turpitude” is not a separate crime at common law but rather a classification of other crimes, see 1 Wayne R. Lafave, Substantive Criminal law § 1.6 (2d ed. 2003), we must also compare the crime of conviction with “crimes we have previously determined to be base, vile, and depraved – crimes such as murder, rape, and incest.” Navarro-Lopez, 503 F.3d at 1075 (opinion of Reinhardt, J., writing for the majority).[46]

[41] Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2007).

[42] Quintero-Salazar, 506 F.3d 688, 693 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007); Gonzalez-Alvarado v. INS, 29 F.3d 245, 246 (9th Cir. 1994); Grageda v. INS, 12 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 1993).

[43] Id. at 1071.

[44] See § 6.6, supra.

[45] See, e.g., Carty v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2005).

[46] Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2008).