Fifth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " CRIMINAL THREATS
United States v. Cruz-Rodriguez, 625 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. Nov. 2, 2010) (per curiam) (California conviction of criminal threats, in violation of Penal Code 422, did not constitute a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), for purposes of imposing a 16-level enhancement to the offense level for illegal reentry sentence: On the other hand, with respect to the offense of making a criminal threat, we previously held in an unpublished opinion that the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another is not an element of California Penal Code 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) because it is possible under [California] law for the State to obtain a conviction under ... the terroristic threats statute without proof of the threatened use of physical force against another person .... United States v. De La Rosa-Hernandez, 264 Fed.Appx. 446, 447-49 (5th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration in original). We likewise find this reasoning persuasive. In addition, this court reached the same conclusion with respect to a similar Pennsylvania statute, holding that the generic terroristic-threat offense at issue in that case is not a crime of violence. United States v. Ortiz-Gomez, 562 F.3d 683, 684-86 (5th Cir.2009). Therefore, we hold that the offense of making a criminal threat is not a crime of violence for the purpose of sentencing adjustments under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).).

Eighth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - TERRORISTIC THREATS
Olmsted v. Holder, 588 F.3d 556 (8th Cir. Dec. 4, 2009) (Minnesota conviction of making terroristic threats, in violation of Minn. Stat. 609.713(1) is a divisible statute, since it may be committed recklessly).

Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " COERCION
Cortez-Guillen v. Holder, 623 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. Oct. 5, 2010) (Alaska conviction of coercion, in violation of Alaska Statute 11.41.530(a)(1), compelling another to do an act by instilling fear of injury or commission of any other crime, did not categorically constitute a crime of violence aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), because it could be committed by a threat of a nonviolent crime such as blackmail).