BIA

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM
Matter of Chairez, 26 I&N Dec. 349 (BIA 2014) (Utah conviction for violation of 76-10-508.1(1)(a), discharge of a firearm, is not categorically an aggravated felony crime of violence, since the offense may be committed recklessly).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM
Matter of Chairez, 26 I&N Dec. 349 (BIA 2014) (Utah conviction for violation of 76-10-508.1(1)(b) and (c), discharge of a firearm in the direction of a building, person, or vehicle, is categorically an aggravated felony crime of violence).

Second Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " POSSESSION OF A FIREARM
United States v. Folkes, 622 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. Sept. 29, 2010) (per curiam) (New York conviction of third-degree criminal possession of a loaded firearm, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 265.02(4), did not categorically constitute crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since the crime of violence definition requires some affirmative conduct beyond mere possession of a gun); following United States v. Gamez, 577 F.3d 394, 398 (2d Cir. 2009).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - POSSESSION OF A WEAPON
United States v. Gamez, 577 F.3d 394 (2d Cir. Aug. 20, 2009) (New York conviction for violation of Penal Law 265.03, second degree possession of a weapon, is not a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes).

Third Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - FIREARMS TRAFFICKING
Joseph v. Attorney General of U.S., ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 2796256 (3d Cir. Oct. 2, 2006) (federal conviction of importing a firearm into a state, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(3), does not constitute an "aggravated felony" of "illicit trafficking in firearms" under INA 101(a)(43)(C) and 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(C), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), because 922(a)(3) does not include a "trafficking element").

AGGRAVATED FELONY - FIREARMS TRAFFICKING - TRANSPORTATION ACROSS STATE LINES
Joseph v. United States Atty Gen., 465 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. Oct. 2, 2006) (federal conviction of 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(3) and 924(a)(1)(D) [transporting firearm across state lines] is not an aggravated felony firearms trafficking offense under INA 101(a)(43)(C) for immigration purposes because the statute does not at a minimum require "trafficking" in firearms; the offense may be committed by bringing ones own firearm across state lines).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - FIREARMS TRAFFICKING - TRANSPORTATION ACROSS STATE LINES
Joseph v. United States Atty Gen., 465 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. Oct. 2, 2006) (federal conviction of 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(3) and 924(a)(1)(D) [transporting firearm across state lines] is not an aggravated felony firearms trafficking offense under INA 101(a)(43)(C) for immigration purposes because the statute does not at a minimum require "trafficking" in firearms; the offense may be committed by bringing ones own firearm across state lines).

Seventh Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " FIREARMS OFFENSES " POSSESSION OF A WEAPON
(Illinois conviction for being in possession of a weapon in violation of 720 ILCS 5/24"1.1(a) did not qualify as an aggravated felony, because Illinoiss definition of a firearm is broader than its federal counterpart because it includes pneumatic weapons). NOTE: Compressed air is not an explosive, which means that pneumatic weapons are not firearms under federal law. See, e.g., United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 853 F.3d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc); United States v. Crooker, 608 F.3d 94, 96 (1st Cir. 2010). Rodriguez-Contreras v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 579, 580 (Cir. 2017).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIMES OF VIOLENCE " COMMITTING FELONY WHILE ARMED
Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, *644 (No. 11-1695) (7th Cir. Aug. 20, 2012) (armed violence, defined as "committing any felony defined by Illinois Law while armed," did not qualify as a Violent Felony when the underlying felony consisted of simple possession of drugs; while there is evidence of a connection between Congresss attempt to keep firearms away from habitual drug users and its goal of reducing violent crime, United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2010), it has not been shown that the mere possession of a gun by a drug user . . . can be described as purposeful, violent, or aggressive conduct within the meaning of Begay.).

POST CON RELIEF " GROUNDS " INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
United States v. Griffin, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (7th Cir., Jul. 5, 2012) (reversing federal conviction for felon in possession of firearms where there was no evidence defendant intended to exercise any control over his father's firearms in his parents' home where he went to live after being released from prison: a defendant's strong connection to the residence alone does not suffice to establish the nexus required to prove his constructive possession of a gun found in the residence.").

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - DISCHARGE OF FIREARM
Jimenez-Gonzalez v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. Nov. 21, 2008) (Indiana conviction for criminal recklessness, in violation of Indiana Code 35-42-2-2(c)(3) [shooting a firearm into an inhabited dwelling], is not an aggravated felony crime of violence since recklessness is insufficient to find conviction of a crime of violence).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - DISCHARGING A FIREARM
United States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 1083731 (7th Cir. May 4, 2005) (Wisconsin conviction for discharging a firearm into a vehicle or building, in violation of W.S.A. 941.20(2)(a), was not a conviction for a "crime of violence" so as to warrant a 16-level increase in the offense level under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) for illegal reentry, since the elements of the offense of conviction did not require that the trier of fact conclude that defendant used or threatened use of physical force against the person of another).

Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " FIREARMS OFFENSES " ANTIQUE FIREARMS DEFENSE
United States v. Hernandez, 769 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 2014) (per curiam) (California conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm under California Penal Code 12021(a)(1), did not categorically qualify as a listed firearms aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(E), 8 U.S.C. 101(a)(43)(E), since the state did not have an exception for antique firearms, as federal law did, and the state in fact prosecuted defendants under this statute for being in possession of antique firearms, and the state statutory definition of firearm is not divisible, so resort to the modified categorical analysis or record of conviction is prohibited).

AGGRAVATED FELONIES " FIREARMS OFFENSES " ANTIQUE FIREARMS
United States v. Aguilera-Rios, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 2723766 (9th Cir. Jun. 17, 2014) (California Penal Code 12021(c)(1), current Penal Code 29800, is not a categorical aggravated felony firearms offense, since the statute lacks an antique firearms exception); explicitly partially overruling Gil v. Holder, 651 F.3d 1000, 1005"06 (9th Cir. 2011), and implicitly partially overruling Matter of Mendez-Orellana, 25 I&N Dec. 254 (BIA 2010).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " 18 US.C. 16(b) " POSSESSION OF SHORT-BARRELED SHOTGUN
United States v. Reyes, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, ___, 2012 WL 5389697 (N.D.Cal., 2012) (conviction of possession of a short-barreled shotgun is not a crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 16(b), because [T]he risk of physical force central to the definition of a crime of violence under 16(b) is the risk of its use in the course of committing the offense"its use in completing the crime.); noting that United States v. Dunn, 946 F.2d 615, 620"21 (9th Cir.1991), has been effectively overruled by Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004); see Covarrubias"Teposte v. Holder, 632 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2011) (embracing the reasoning of Leocal in defining a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), the court held that a California conviction for shooting at an inhabited dwelling or vehicle under California Penal Code 246 was not categorically a crime of violence: In order to be a predicate offense under either 16 approach, the underlying offense must require proof of an intentional use of force or a substantial risk that force will be intentionally used during its commission.), citing United States v. Gomez"Leon, 545 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " 18 US.C. 16(b) " POSSESSION OF SHORT-BARRELED SHOTGUN
United States v. Reyes, 907 F.Supp.2d 1068 (N.D.Cal., 2012) (conviction of possession of a short-barreled shotgun is not a crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 16(b), because [T]he risk of physical force central to the definition of a crime of violence under 16(b) is the risk of its use in the course of committing the offense"its use in completing the crime.); noting that United States v. Dunn, 946 F.2d 615, 620"21 (9th Cir.1991), has been effectively overruled by Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004); see Covarrubias"Teposte v. Holder, 632 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2011) (embracing the reasoning of Leocal in defining a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), the court held that a California conviction for shooting at an inhabited dwelling or vehicle under California Penal Code 246 was not categorically a crime of violence: In order to be a predicate offense under either 16 approach, the underlying offense must require proof of an intentional use of force or a substantial risk that force will be intentionally used during its commission.), citing United States v. Gomez"Leon, 545 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - SHOOTING AT INHABITED DWELLING
United States v. Narvaez-Gomez, 489 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. Jun. 6, 2007) (California conviction of under Penal Code 246 (maliciously and willfully discharge firearm at inhabited building or vehicle) did not categorically constitute a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2, application note 1(B)(iii) ("crime of violence" is a "federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another."), since the elements of this offense allow conviction for reckless or grossly negligent conduct, rather than requiring intentional use of force), holding that Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc) (limiting categorical crimes of violence to offenses committed through intentional use of force against the person of another rather than reckless or grossly negligent conduct), abrogates United States v. Lopez-Torres, 443 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. April 25, 2006).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - POSSESSION OF ASSAULT WEAPON
United States v. Serna, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2006) (sentence for felon in possession of a firearm vacated since prior conviction for possession of assault weapon in violation of California Penal Code 12280(b) was not "crime of violence" under the federal Sentencing Guidelines for purposes of sentence enhancement).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0410597p.pdf

Eleventh Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " THROWING A DEADLY MISSLE AT AN OCCUPIED VEHICLE
United States v. Estrada, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 479969 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2015) (per curiam) (Florida conviction for throwing a deadly missile, a violation of Florida Statute 790.19, was not categorically a conviction for a crime of violence, for illegal reentry sentencing purposes, because We concluded that Estrella could be deemed to have been convicted of a crime of violence if his conviction was for wanton conduct, because Florida law defines wanton to mean that one has acted intentionally or with reckless indifference to the consequences and with knowledge that damage is likely to be done to some person. Id. at 1253. But if instead Estrella had been convicted of only malicious conduct, the latter was satisfied by knowledge that injury or damage would be done to a person or to property and, in that case, Estrella would not be deemed to have been convicted of a crime of violence.), following United States v. Estrella, 758 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2014).

Other

AGGRAVATED FELONY - VEHICULAR HOMICIDE
See § 7.54

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ATTEMPTING TO ELUDE POLICE VEHICLE
See § 7.49

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER
See § 7.49

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR - WASHINGTON CONVICTION OF COMMUNICATING WITH A MINOR FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES HELD NOT TO BE SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR UNDER A CATEGORICAL ANALYSIS, BUT WAS A DIVISIBLE STATUTE
See § 7.34