Escape from prison. 

 

United States ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F.Supp. 534 (D.Pa. 1947) (in determining whether offense of breaking prison and escaping involved moral turpitude, the fact that such crime was accomplished without force by merely walking through an open door is immaterial);

Matter of B, 5 I. & N. Dec. 538 (BIA 1953) (conviction of violating § 15-16 of Chapter 268 of the Annotated Laws of Massachusetts (vol. 9) embraces several different types of misconduct, some of which might involve moral turpitude; a conviction of unlawfully aiding one to escape from jail is not a crime involving moral turpitude when there is nothing in the record of conviction which brings the offense within any of the classes of cases which might involve moral turpitude under the statute);

Matter of J, 4 I. & N. Dec. 512 (BIA 1951) (conviction of attempt to escape from reformatory in violation of Chapter 268, § 16 of the Annotated Laws of Massachusetts is “malum prohibitum” and does not involve moral turpitude, since “escape” is not defined by statute and the wording of the statute does not require a specific criminal intent);

Matter of M, 2 I. & N. Dec. 871 (BIA 1947) (conviction of breaking prison, in violation of § 12, Chapter 94, Laws of New Jersey (1931), does not involve moral turpitude since it does not require the element of force or fraud);

Matter of Z, 1 I. & N. Dec. 235 (BIA 1942) (prison breach in violation of § 52-12, New Jersey Compiled Statutes of 1924, does not involve moral turpitude since the offense did not require force or fraud as an essential element).

 

           

            Evading Arrest.

 

Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. Dec. 29, 2004) (Illinois conviction of aggravated fleeing from a police officer in violation of 625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(1), constitutes a CMT: "It seems to us that a person who deliberately flees at a high speed from an officer who, the fleer knows, wants him to stop, thus deliberately flouting lawful authority and endangering the officer, other drivers, passengers, and pedestrians, is deliberately engaged in seriously wrongful behavior, as held in People v. Dewey, supra, albeit under a somewhat differently worded statute. See also Knapik v. Ashcroft, supra. He may not want to endanger anyone, but he has to know that he is greatly increasing the risk of an accident (and for the further reason that a fleeing driver is dividing his attention between the road ahead and his pursuer); and he is doing so as a consequence of his deliberate and improper decision to ignore a lawful order of the police. We conclude, therefore, that aggravated fleeing is indeed a crime involving moral turpitude.").

 

Knowingly harboring a fugitive from justice.

 

Matter of Sloan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 840 (AG 1968) (conviction for harboring and concealing a person from arrest in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1071 was contrary to justice and an act of baseness, so that it involved moral turpitude).

 

            See also § 9.5, supra, misprision of a felony.

BIA

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " ESCAPE " HIGH SPEED FLIGHT FROM POLICE
Matter of Ruiz-Lopez, 25 I&N Dec. 551 (BIA 2011) (Washington conviction of driving a vehicle in a manner indicating a wanton or willful disregard for the lives or property of others while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, in violation of RCW 46.61.024, is a crime involving moral turpitude, because reckless disregard is a sufficiently evil mental state).